Plan of Attack, Part 4
Administration members concluded, one at a time, throughout January 2003, that the president had decided to go to war, even though Bush himself was still questioning his advisors as to when he truly had to make a final decision. The advisors themselves each came to the conclusion through observing Bush's comments, actions, and priorities.
Dick Cheney made his decision by 11 January, when he invited Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar to his office. He wanted to communicate go ahead and communicate a decision to the Saudis; Bush's continuing interest in future points of no return was of no consequence to him. Also in Cheney's office were Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In order to convince Bandar of the necessity of Saudi operational support for an invasion of Iraq, Myers showed him a large map labeled TOP SECRET NOFORN -- top secret classified material that was not to be seen by any foreign national. Bandar, who was a former fighter pilot, asked for a copy and was refused, although Rumsfeld assured him that "we'll give you all the information you want."
Bandar needed certainty of war as a price for Saudi cooperation. He believed that Saddam, if he was allowed to remain in power as he was in 1991, would kill all high-level personnel involved in that war, including Bandar himself. However, if the US was truly intent on removing Saddam, the Saudis would support the war effort with direct involvement. Cheney told Bandar, therefore, that war was certain and "Saddam is toast." Rumsfeld did not contradict him, even though Bush had asked him about a forthcoming final decision poit less than two weeks prior.
Bandar wanted confirmation from Bush, so Rice invited him to meet with the president on Monday, January 13. Bush asked Bandar whether he had been briefed by Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Myers, and whether he had any questions. Bush said, "That is the message I want you to carry for me to the crown prince. The message you're taking is mine, Bandar." The message, of course, had originated with Cheney, but Bandar believed Cheney had told Bush to say that it was Bush's own message, in order to have Bush sign off on whatever Cheney had said.
Note that
other staff members still did not believe the decision had been made, including Andy Card, the White House Chief of Staff, and, more seriously, Colin Powell. Bush rectified this before Powell heard it secondhand from Prince Bandar by informing him on 13 January 2003 that he had made up his mind.
At about the same time (early January 2003) Defense suggested taking control of postwar activity from State. This was logical, but it was very late in the game. The NSC staff had only about a week to prepare the document setting up the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in DoD. The office was both planning and implementation, and its resources were further strained by turf wars. Powell sent two State Department Arab experts to ORHA, but Rumsfeld kicked them out of the Pentagon. Why? Rumsfeld said that the postwar planning work had to be done by people truly committed to the war and supportive of regime change. Powell also wanted to assign seven other senior officials to ORHA but Douglas Feith wanted outsiders, because neither he and Cheney trusted the State Department insiders. People at the State Department were apt to argue that achieving democracy in Iraq was not feasible, and Cheney and Feith therefore thought that such people would not be sufficiently supportive of the president's stated policy of a democratic Iraq. Instead, they sought greater ideological purity in the postwar planning office.
Keep reading in
Part 5.
