Plan of Attack, Part 7
In early March 2003, Tony Blair and his government were in trouble due to Blair's support of Bush in the push for war against Iraq. Bush recognized the necessity of continuing to work on diplomacy in order to preserve the support he was getting from his strongest ally, and he was worried that Blair might lose his job if Bush decided to go to war without the passage of a second UN resolution. He urged Blair to consider a lesser role in such a war, using British forces for "a second wave, peacekeepers or something. I would rather go alone than have your government fall." Blair appreciated the gesture, but was convinced that he and Bush were doing the right thing to act against Saddam, regardless of how the diplomacy went. "It's good of you to say that. But I'm there to the very end."
These considerations of Blair's future were necessary because of the continuing uncertainty over whether the UN Security Council would pass a second resolution explicitly authorizing war. Only the US, Britain, Spain, and Bulgaria were committed, though three African nations were on the fence. The final effort was to try to get the support of Mexico and Chile. Vicente Fox refused to answer whether he would support such a resolution; Ricardo Lagos, the President of Chile, said that Chile would not. At this point it became clear to the Bush Administration that no resolution explicitly authorizing force could win passage. At the very least, France, which remained committed to the idea that war was unnecessary, would veto such a resolution, and even if they did not, it was questionable whether the coalition could gain a majority.
But war, and war soon, had become a political and foreign-policy necessity for Bush, regardless of what the UN decided. American conservatives both in Congress and in the press were pushing for an end to diplomacy. They believed Saddam was dangerous and that stalling only made him bolder. American business leaders and the stock market were suffering because of uncertainty over whether war would really happen. Leaders in the Middle East were starting to complain. The seeming indecision was causing problems throughout the region, especially in Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Covert operations inside Iraq had already begun, including sabotage which caused a train derailment between Mosul and Baghdad on March 15. And with over 200,000 troops in the Middle East, Bush was in a position where to back down would be, he thought, politically disastrous.
Bush, Blair, Jose Maria Aznar of Spain, and Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, the prime minister of Portugal, met in the Azores on March 16. There was some discussion of postwar planning. In speaking about the international context of postwar Iraq, Bush said, "The UN can help with many issues but should not run the country." The key point of discussion, however, was the continuing diplomatic situation. With the clear failure of the coalition to get a second resolution, the diplomatic efforts of the coalition nations had switched to preventing the introduction of a Security Council counter-resolution to delay the "serious consequences" promised in Resolution 1441. Such a resolution would take away any legitimacy granted by Resolution 1441 to a war effort.
The potential counter-resolution was headed off by working closely with Chile and Russia to maintain a Security Council stalemate. On March 17, at 8:55 am Bush met with the National Security Council, and Colin Powell reported that the diplomatic situation remained unchanged. Bush therefore decided to go ahead, withdraw the second resolution, and deliver an ultimatum that evening to Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq or face invasion. The next day, Tuesday, March 18, Blair gave his own speech, which was widely acclaimed even by his critics. The Parliament ended up voting 396-217 for war.
The ultimatum expired after 48 hours. Therefore, the next day, March 19, after one final meeting with the National Security Council and a consultation with the field commanders in the Middle East, Bush gave the order to execute Operation Iraqi Freedom. The final war plan called for 48 hours of stealth operations. This was changed after the launch of the operation because of intelligence that Saddam would be in a specific location called Dora Farm. Bush decided that the intelligence was good enough to change the plans and openly strike at Saddam. This made it necessary to inform not only coalition members but also neighboring governments including Saudi Arabia. Prince Bandar was told at 8:28 pm, a little over an hour after Bush had made the decision to launch the F-117s that would attack Saddam. Upon leaving the White House, he immediately called Crown Prince Abdullah, speaking in a prearranged code to let him know that open warfare was imminent. Abdullah asked Bandar, "Do you know how soon the storm is going to hit?" Bandar replied, potentially blowing operational security if anyone was listening in on the call, "Sir, I don't know, but watch TV."
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Good news! The only thing left is the Epilogue, which is covered in
Part 8 and
Part 9. Maybe I'll be done with this before I'm old enough for Medicare.
