Plan of Attack: Final Thoughts
This is the last entry on Bob Woodward's
Plan of Attack. To read from the beginning of the series, go to
Part 1.
...
So, my thoughts on
Plan of Attack. Yes, first of all, I recommend the book. Nowhere else, I think, can you find such a wealth of detail on things happening in and around the Bush Adminstration concerning the preparation for the Iraq War. The book is a long and tedious slog, and it's got zero narrative structure, but it's so unbelievably detailed that it makes up for that. Even as you turn a page and wonder how long it can possibly take to read 450 pages, I just couldn't stop reading it.
What do I think about the Iraq War? During most of the run-up to war, I was skeptical of the necessity. I did not believe Saddam Hussein was enough of a threat to justify war, particularly after he allowed weapons inspectors back into Iraq, and it wasn't clear to me why the Administration had started beating the war drums in the first place, in 2002. Due to my own personal situation, I had largely lost track of developments in current events in July 2002, so my opinion was not well-informed at that time.
I converted to supporting war on April 8, the day before Saddam fell (which was fortunate for me, as I got to wholeheartedly enjoy the toppling of the statue and whatnot). My friend
Andrew convinced me that even though I didn't agree with the stated reasons for war, there were other sound reasons to support it, including the fact that we would be removing a horrible tyrant from power. Of course I knew that Saddam Hussein was a bad and evil man, but those weren't the stated grounds for invasion (obviously; that would never have flown at the UN). Andrew convinced me that it didn't matter. I still agree with that. I think the forced removal of Saddam Hussein, in the abstract, was a good thing.
The problem, of course, is that wars are fought in reality, not in the abstract. Removing Saddam was a noble goal, but it seems clear this Administration was the wrong group of people to bring about true success in the form of a free and democratic Iraq. I suspect that goal could not be achieved without full UN support, and
Plan of Attack clearly shows that the Bush Administration was only interested in UN support as a means to the end of giving our coalition allies, such as Britain, the political cover necessary to join us.
The UN had insufficient will in 1998 when Saddam kicked out the inspectors in the first place. So did the Clinton Administration. Something should have been done at that time. The neoconservatives were right about that, and they were right to make sure that Iraq stayed on the radar within the Defense Department and the rest of the Administration. I didn't appreciate at all that there was any merit to their position until I read the book. Unfortunately, they went much farther than that, hyping the Iraq threat to the exclusion of all else.
When the 9/11 attacks happened, therefore, it was an opportunity for them to finally get what they wanted (after the necessity of invading Afghanistan was dealt with). All they had to do was to link the bona fide issue of Iraq and its defiance of the UN's demand for disarmament to the specter of terrorism and weapons proliferation to get the support of the American people. If there had been ironclad intelligence of WMD, that would have clearly established the threat and the necessity. Perhaps the world community would have been more supportive of action with such intelligence. But the intelligence simply didn't exist, and instead of acknowledging the uncertain reality, Cheney and others within the Administration relied instead on overstated NIEs and unsubstantiated assertions not backed by any intelligence at all (which was quite shocking to read).
Removing Saddam Hussein from power was a good thing. I think that's undeniable. But it was irresponsible at best to bring about his removal without a well-developed and reasonable plan for something better to replace him.
Plan of Attack makes it clear that there was no such plan. Postwar planning was a low priority, and it was conducted with more concern for ideological purity than effectiveness. Inflicting the uncertainty and violence of combat on other human beings without such a plan is morally reprehensible.
